| Title: | A Mechanism Design Approach to Allocating Travel Funds |
| Speaker: | Michael Jones Associate Editor Mathematical Reviews/American Mathematical Society Ann Arbor, MI |
| Abstract: | In mathematics and other disciplines, faculty members are required to give professional talks at conferences on their research or teaching. When I was at Montclair State University in New Jersey, the financial requests for travel exceeded the amount the School of Science and Mathematics had budgeted, which meant that only a percentage of travel was covered. Because faculty were exploiting the method used to distribute limited travel funds among the faculty, the associate dean asked me to construct a new method. In this talk, I'll explain the old method to award travel funds and how faculty were misrepresenting their financial needs to get a higher percentage of their travel paid for. Then, I'll explain the new method. The new method views allocating travel funds as a game. The method constructs a game in which it is each of the faculty member's best interest to reveal truthfully their financial needs. Thus, being truthful is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The method has the added benefit that it encouraged faculty to be conservative in their spending so that they get a higher percentage of their travel paid for. The process of constructing such a game is called mechanism design. |
| Location: | Palenske 227 |
| Date: | 2/1/2018 |
| Time: | 3:30 PM |
@abstract{MCS:Colloquium:MichaelJones:2018:2:1,
author = "{Michael Jones}",
title = "{A Mechanism Design Approach to Allocating Travel Funds}",
address = "{Albion College Mathematics and Computer Science Colloquium}",
month = "{1 February}",
year = "{2018}"
}