In mathematics and other disciplines, faculty members are required to give professional talks at conferences on their research or teaching. When I was at Montclair State University in New Jersey, the financial requests for travel exceeded the amount the School of Science and Mathematics had budgeted, which meant that only a percentage of travel was covered. Because faculty were exploiting the method used to distribute limited travel funds among the faculty, the associate dean asked me to construct a new method. In this talk, I'll explain the old method to award travel funds and how faculty were misrepresenting their financial needs to get a higher percentage of their travel paid for. Then, I'll explain the new method. The new method views allocating travel funds as a game. The method constructs a game in which it is each of the faculty member's best interest to reveal truthfully their financial needs. Thus, being truthful is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The method has the added benefit that it encouraged faculty to be conservative in their spending so that they get a higher percentage of their travel paid for. The process of constructing such a game is called mechanism design.