1. "Is Poseidonios' organization of Euclidean geometry any "better" that Euclid's?" Pg 123 Are the two statements "logically equivalent?"

2. "It is ironic that though no measurement of a triangle can prove Postulate 5, it is possible to conceive of a measurement that would disprove it" pg 150. How is this possible?

3. Even if we could create an instrument that could measure such small units such as, 179.9999999971 degrees, is that safe to say it's 180 degrees or can we not assume it is close enough? pg 150

4. "Though it certainly seems impossible to imagine a straight line parallel to AB in one sense but not the other, the issue here is not what is imaginable, but what is logical". To me imaginable and logic go hand in hand. If you can imagine something, then it is logical to you. Why does it tell us they are not the same concept? p119

5. "Euclid himself was somehow uncomfortable with Postulate 5. The fact that until Theorem 29 no theorem depends on it, and thereafter every theorem except Theorem 31 depends on it, make it appear as if he wanted to postpone using it as long as he could". Why was Euclid so uncomfortable with Postulate 5?

6. From the reading so far, is the gap in Postulate 5 and the need to use another replacement postulate apparent? Is it easy to see where non-Euclidean geometry would intersect or are you just frustrated with the idea of replacement postulates substituting Postulate 5 with a seemingly unknown axiom behind both?

7. Would a curving surface such as the one Gauss measured change the way Postulate 5 was considered?